issues that explain why automation often fails to deliver its promised benefits and inspired substantial research to address these issues.
AN IMPORTANT NODE IN THE NETWORK OF AUTOMATION-RELATED ARTICLES
Parasuraman and Riley (1997) reviewed 120 papers related to human interaction with automation. This review included several of the most influential papers in the field of human factors engineering. Table 1 shows 10 of the most frequently cited of these papers, which consider a broad range of issues, including the role of heuristics and biases, trust in automation, representation aiding, adaptive automation, and analytic techniques to assess human-automation interaction. These papers represent some of the 71 papers published in Human Factors over the past 50 years that directly address the issue of automation. These papers consider the effects of automation across domains that include aircraft cockpits, command and control, manufacturing, maritime operations, medicine, driving, process control, and air traffic control.
"Humans and Automation" has also been very influential, garnering 126 citations since publication and 31 in 2007 alone. Of the papers citing "Humans and Automation," several have also begun to emerge as influential, as indicated by the citations shown in Table 1 . Of the five most frequently cited papers, three concern the role of decision biases and trust in guiding reliance, and two describe qualitative and quantitative models that can guide automation design. "Humans and Automation" represents an important node in the network of automation-related research.
CHALLENGES: AUTOMATION USE, MISUSE, AND ABUSE
As suggested by its title, "Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse" describes why automation often fails to perform as expected. Automation designers frequently fail to account for how people adapt to the introduction of automation, leading to unanticipated negative consequences concerning satisfaction, performance, and safety. Such consequences were documented more than a decade before "Humans and Automation" in papers such as "Flight-Deck Automation: Promises and Problems" (Wiener & Curry, 1980) and "Ironies of Automation" (Bainbridge, 1983) . Fundamental ironies identified by these papers are that automation designed to enhance safety does not always enhance safety and that as automation becomes more sophisticated, the role of the human becomes more, rather than less, important. "Humans and Automation" builds on these insights and points to how differing expectations across designers, managers, and operators lead to a failure to support operators in using the automation effectively (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997) . "Humans and Automation" describes a mismatch of inappropriate expectations and requirements regarding the support of operators. An important contribution of this article was to characterize these mismatches in terms of misuse, disuse, and abuse. This categorization makes useful distinctions that continue to guide automationrelated research, as reflected in a recent review (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2006) .
Use of automation refers to operators engaging automation to perform functions they might otherwise perform manually. Appropriate use of automation can enhance safety and performance. Automation use depends on a complex interaction of factors that include workload, cognitive overhead, trust in automation, self-confidence, and risk. Although one might expect automation to reduce workload and be engaged by operators to mitigate high-workload situations, this is often not the case. Clumsy automation often simplifies easy tasks and accentuates the difficulties of hard tasks rather than smoothing workload peaks and valleys (Wiener,1989) . One reason for this outcome is the overhead associated with engaging and disengaging automation, as documented by the model-based analysis of Kirlik (1993) . Another reason is that the apparent simplicity of automation masks its actual complexity, which is only revealed in demanding situations (Woods, 1994) .
Misuse concerns situations in which operators rely on automation when the automation performs poorly. In these situations, operators might overtrust the automation (Lee & See, 2004) , use heuristics to engage automation in situations that are often but not always appropriate, or fall prey to automation biases that make them less attentive to contradictory information (Mosier, Skitka, & Korte, 1994; Skitka, Mosier, & Burdick, 1999 , 2000 .
One important aspect of misuse concerns monitoring failures, in which operators tend to neglect automation breakdowns. The likelihood of these monitoring failures is inversely proportional to the likelihood of the failure frequency. These failures are also more likely to occur when the manual task load is high and the failures lack a salient cue. Parasuraman and Riley (1997) cite the case of the Royal Majesty, in which the GPS signal to the electronic chart failed without a salient indication, leading to a monitoring failure that led the crew to neglect other sources of information until the ship ran aground (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 1997). Such examples of misuse focus on situations that might be best described as overuse, frequently induced by overtrust. Although not directly addressed in "Humans and Automation," other examples of misuse include situations in which people use automation in ways the designers did not anticipate. For example, some drivers have misused the antilock braking system (ABS) by driving faster and following more closely, undermining the anticipated safety benefit of the automation (Sagberg, Fosser, & Saetermo, 1997) . Disuse concerns situations in which operators fail to engage automation when it could enhance performance. Operators are often slow to accept automation because it threatens their way of life, they have not developed trust in its capability, or the automation lacks the needed functionality (Lee, 2006) . Warnings represent a specific type of automation that has a long history of disuse in process control, aviation, and driving (F. P. Lees, 1983; Woods, 1995) . "Humans and Automation" describes how the high rate of false alarms in systems with a low base rate of situations deserving a warning is likely to undermine acceptance and lead to disuse. The paper describes a highly sensitive system that misses only 1 of every 1,000 hazardous events and has a relatively low false alarm rate of .0594. Even so, if the base rate of a hazardous condition is low (e.g., .001), then the system will generate 59 false alarms for every true warning. This rate is comparable with the 28 true alerts and 980 false alarms in a recent field test of an automotive forward collision warning system -a rate of approximately 1 alert per hundred miles and 35 false alarms for every true warning (Najm, Stearns, Howarth, Koopmann, & Hitz, 2005) .
How false alarms affect acceptance is not clear, but recent evidence suggests that not all false alarms are perceived as being equally useless. Weather forecasters' near misses are considered differently than forecasts that are off by a wider margin (Barnes, Gruntfest, Hayden, Schultz, & Benight, 2007) . Similarly, collision warnings that drivers can associate with the traffic situation do not lead to the degree of distrust and disuse associated with alerts that drivers view as being random failures of the system (M. N. Lees & Lee, 2007) . Parasuraman and Riley (1997) describe automation misuse and disuse as a reflection of a complex interaction of many factors, such as risk, workload, and self-confidence. In high-workload situations in which the operator has little confidence in his or her capacity to respond, misuse is more likely than disuse. Of the many factors that influence misuse and disuse, trust has emerged as a particularly important factor. Overtrust leads to misuse and undertrust leads disuse (Lee & Moray, 1992; Muir, 1987) . Trust tends to reflect the capacity of the automation and so often leads to appropriate use, but many factors unrelated to the capacity of the automation can influence trust (Lee & See, 2004) . As an example, trust in an online banking system was greater when the interface used cool pastel colors rather than warm primary colors (Kim & Moon, 1998) . Understanding misuse and disuse may depend on understanding the complex array of factors that lead to overtrust and undertrust.
Abuse concerns situations in which automation is designed and implemented without paying sufficient attention to its effects on the operators. Abuse often occurs when designers or managers believe that replacing unreliable people with reliable automation will reduce errors and enhance efficiency. For example, weight-on-wheels sensors have been installed on aircraft to prevent pilots from inadvertently deploying thrust reversers while in flight. When this sensor fails, it prevents pilots from engaging the thrust reversers while landing, leading to a new and serious failure (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997) .
The "replacement fallacy" that underlies the assumption that failures can be avoided by automating the operator's role ignores the role people play in accommodating the unexpected and in maintaining a safe and efficient system (Woods & Dekker, 2000) . Automation aimed at replacing the human often has the ironic effect of undermining performance because it leaves people unsupported in accommodating the situations that the automation cannot accommodate. Automation abuse often occurs because designers create automation that has a high degree of authority and autonomy (Sarter & Woods, 1994) , leading to surprises as the automation responds in ways that the operator does not expect (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997) . Additional feedback, such as haptic vibration that signals mode transitions of flight control systems, can mitigate this abuse (Sklar & Sarter, 1999) ; however, the fundamental problem rests in a technology-centered design and management philosophy.
The most frequently cited contribution of Parasuraman and Riley's (1997) paper is the characterization of automation use, misuse, and abuse, but the paper also includes two less broadly recognized themes. These themes cut across the issues of misuse, disuse, and abuse: vicious cycles and the balance of control between the designer, manager, and the operator.
Vicious cycles occur when a negative outcome leads to a response that leads to further negative outcomes. Such vicious cycles can exacerbate an automation-related problem as the problem is magnified over repeated interactions. As an example, Parasuraman and Riley (1997) describe the potential for highly autonomous automation to give operators little time to exercise their skills. Inadequate skills may lead operators to overrely on automation. This misuse might then diminish the operator's skills further and lead to greater misuse, which in turn could undermine skills, creating a vicious cycle that greatly increases the prevalence of misuse. A similar pattern can occur with abuse. Parasuraman and Riley describe how automation abuse "can lead to misuse and disuse of automation by operators. If this results in managers' implementing additional high-level automation, further disuse or misuse by operators may follow, and so on, in a vicious circle" (p. 284). In this way, managers' and designers' desire to insert automation to eliminate human error may distance the operator from the system and make errors more likely, leading designers and management to further substitute automation for the operator and further marginalize the operator.
The vicious cycle involving escalating automation abuse illustrates a fundamental challenge regarding the balance of control between the designer and the operator in the meta-control of a system. Although this issue of meta-control is not directly addressed in "Humans and Automation," it underlies many instances of misuse, disuse, and abuse. To the extent that the process is well understood and precise and repeatable actions are needed, automation designers and management may be in a better position than operators to enhance performance and safety. To the extent that unanticipated variability and creative solutions are required, operator discretion concerning when and how to engage automation must be supported.
This meta-control problem must balance the benefits of top-down control, in which designers and managers define the role of technology, with the benefits of bottom-up control, in which operators define when and how automation is used. Poor feedback and poor understanding of the process being controlled make this a difficult control problem. Designers and managers have limited feedback, often constrained to the failures caused by "human error," and operators' successful adaptations mask the complexity and unanticipated situations that the automation fails to accommodate (Woods & Dekker, 2000) . As noted by Parasuraman and Riley (1997) , many problems with automation stem from the mismatch of the expectations that designers and managers have regarding the need to support the operator managing the automation. Mismatched expectations are one symptom of dysfunctional meta-control.
TOOLS, AGENTS, AND CYBORGS
Many metaphors have been used to describe automation, including that of a tool, prosthesis, supervisee, and agent (Lee, 2006) . With any of these metaphors, automation does not simply replace the human in performing a function; rather, automation transforms the work as operators adapt to the new opportunities it affords (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997) . For example, electronic charts transform the navigation work of a mariner from an active interaction involving estimating positions, extrapolating the path, and planning waypoints to passive monitoring of the progress along a route (Lee & Sanquist, 2000) . Anticipating the consequences of this transformation and operators' adaptation to it poses a substantial challenge in the design and management of automation, particularly because it is so often neglected (Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, Hoffman, & Feltovich, 2004) . As automation begins to mediate the cooperation and coordination between operators, these consequences may become even more critical and difficult to anticipate (Gao & Lee, 2006) .
Even relatively mundane technology can have profound effects on human cognition as people adapt to it. Parasuraman and Riley (1997) note that external storage of information, such as books and written communication, as opposed to internal storage through rote memorization, has played a central role in the evolution of human cognition (see also Tomasello, 1999) . Likewise, the concept of distributed cognition describes the important influence external representations have on human cognition (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000; Hutchins, 1995) . As an example, Hutchins (1995) argues that a cockpit, composed of the pilots and the instrumentation, remembers its speed rather than just the pilot. Memory is partly an external representation developed when pilots move "speed bugs," which are adjustable pointers on the bezel of the airspeed indicator. Pilots adapt the simple technology of speed bugs to provide an external memory that indicates when the flaps and slats of the plane must be adjusted as the airspeed changes. Compared with speed bugs, automation represents a much more powerful extension to human cognition because operators adapt to it and it can adapt to operators (Byrne & Parasuraman, 1996; Rouse, 1988) .
A metaphor of automation as a cybernetic organism -cyborg -captures the tendency for operators to adapt to automation and for how automation in turn might adapt to them. Cyborg describes a hybrid organism in which the technology and the human become so intertwined that the capacity of humans cannot be meaningfully described without considering their technological appendages (Clark, 2003; Haraway, 1991) . Although not described in "Humans and Automation," the cyborg metaphor suggests a coevolution and adaptation of operators and technology that could result in profound cultural and cognitive changes that go well beyond the ability of automation to transform work. With the cyborg metaphor, the boundary separating the operator and the automation blurs. Such an intimate coupling of operators and automation greatly magnifies the consequences of use, misuse, and abuse and also poses philosophical concerns regarding the teleology of technology (Hancock, 1996) . As the boundary between automation and the operator blurs, it becomes increasingly critical that designers recognize that they engineer relationships and not simply technology (Sheridan, 2002) .
"Humans and Automation" will continue to be useful because issues related to use, misuse, and disuse will become increasingly important as automation plays an increasingly important role in our society. The evolution of technology, even in the past decade, demonstrates that the interactions between humans and automation are becoming increasingly important and intimate.
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